Arrêt de service lundi 11 juillet de 12h30 à 13h : tous les sites du CCSD (HAL, Epiciences, SciencesConf, AureHAL) seront inaccessibles (branchement réseau à modifier)
Accéder directement au contenu Accéder directement à la navigation
Article dans une revue

Does It Really Pay to Do Better? Exploring the Financial Effects of Changes in CSR Ratings

Abstract : Previous literature on the link between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and financial performance has focused mainly on the financial implications of a firm's level of CSR without considering the potential effects on financial performance of variations in CSR rating. We try to fill this gap by studying whether variations in a firm's CSR rating affect systematic risk, firm value, and portfolio performance. First, our results show that an increase in firms' CSR efforts, as reflected by an increase in their CSR ratings, significantly reduces systematic risk. Second, a positive variation in CSR ratings significantly improves firm value. Finally, from a portfolio perspective, a strategy that consists of buying stocks that have experienced a CSR ratings increase and selling stocks that have experienced a CSR ratings decrease (or remain stable) leads to lower financial performance. Taken together, our findings provide new evidence and financial implications for firms and portfolio managers. \textcopyright 2018, \textcopyright 2018 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
Type de document :
Article dans une revue
Liste complète des métadonnées

https://hal-u-picardie.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03680601
Contributeur : Louise DESSAIVRE Connectez-vous pour contacter le contributeur
Soumis le : samedi 28 mai 2022 - 14:43:05
Dernière modification le : dimanche 29 mai 2022 - 03:00:21

Identifiants

Collections

Citation

M. Benlemlih, J. Jaballah, Jonathan Peillex. Does It Really Pay to Do Better? Exploring the Financial Effects of Changes in CSR Ratings. Applied Economics, 2018, 50 (51), pp.5464--5482. ⟨10.1080/00036846.2018.1486997⟩. ⟨hal-03680601⟩

Partager

Métriques

Consultations de la notice

0